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Abstract 
Debate about the epistemic prowess of historical science has focused on local 
underdetermination problems generated by a lack of historical data; the prevalence of 
information loss over geological time, and the capacities of scientists to mitigate it. Drawing on 
Leonelli’s recent distinction between ‘phenomena-time’ and ‘data-time’ I argue that factors like 
data generation, curation and management significantly complexifies and undermines this: 
underdetermination is a bad way of framing the challenges historical scientists face. In doing so, I 
identify circumstances of ‘epistemic scarcity’ where underdetermination problems are 
particularly salient, and discuss cases where ‘legacy data’—data generated using differing 
technologies and systems of practice—are drawn upon to overcome underdetermination. This 
suggests that one source of overcoming underdetermination is our knowledge of science’s past. 
Further, data-time makes agnostic positions about the epistemic fortunes of scientists working 
under epistemic scarcity more plausible. But agnosticism seems to leave philosophers without 
much normative grip. So, I sketch an alternative approach: focusing on the strategies scientists 
adopt to maximize their epistemic power in light of the resources available to them. 
1. Data-Time & Information Destruction 
Disputes about the legitimacy and power of scientists’ capacity to gain knowledge of the 
deep past is often framed using ‘underdetermination’. I’ll argue that if we take scientific practice 
seriously, then underdetermination is a bad way of framing many such investigations. Happily, 
there are alternative framings. To show this, I want to focus on a circumstance historical 
scientists often find themselves in—‘epistemic scarcity’—and explore the consequences of a 
distinction Sabina Leonelli has recently drawn between ‘phenomena-time’ and ‘data-time’. Let’s 
start with that distinction. 
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The historical sciences, unsurprisingly, are intimately concerned with time. Cosmologists, 
archaeologists, geologists and paleontologists provide wide-scale temporal sequences; ages, 
epochs, eons. Across these sequences they stretch narratives: the formation of galaxies, 
mountain-ranges, societies and speciation; tales of transformation, destruction, and extinction. 
The inferences underwriting these narratives rely on the remnants of those past events. These 
temporal dimensions concern what Leonelli has called ‘phenomena-time’, the lifetimes of the 
natural processes, entities and events that scientists seek to understand. She distinguishes this 
from ‘data-time’: “the temporal dimension of data practices used to prepare and manage data so 
that they can be subjected to inferential reasoning” (Leonelli 2018 742-743). Paleontologists, for 
instance, must extract, prepare, analyze and store fossils; their access to the deep past depends 
in part on practices of data generation, management and analysis. Philosophers have 
insufficiently attended to the epistemic consequences of data-time. 
Phenomena-time draws our attention to information-loss due to natural historical processes1, 
such as the patchiness of the fossil record. By contrast, data-time highlights information-
destroying processes within science itself. Not every fossil is extracted, and extraction often 
involves mistakes, breakages, and so forth. Cataloguing inevitably highlights some details (often 
phylogenetic and temporal) while backgrounding others, and errors are frequent. Storage—
especially for larger fossils—is expensive, often inadequate, and specimens are lost, mislabeled 
and degrade. Fossil preparation, particularly in vertebrate paleontology, is a careful art which can 
involve as much information-loss as extraction itself (Wylie 2019, 2015). 
My aim in this paper is to connect data-time with philosophical discussion of 
underdetermination. In brief, many (perhaps most, perhaps all) scientific hypotheses are 
underdetermined by their evidence. That is, the available evidence is insufficient to support going 
hypotheses over rivals. Views on the future success of science, then, partly turns on our 
                                                             
1 The notion of  ‘information-destroying processes’ is owed to Sober 1991. 
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confidence in the capacity of scientists to overcome underdetermination. Pessimists point to 
information-destruction; optimists to the creativity and tenacity of scientists, as well as 
technology’s transformative capacities. Data-time complexifies these discussions by highlighting 
both new sources of underdetermination and new routes to overcoming it.  
I’ll focus on legacy data, data extracted in historical contexts using different technologies, 
systems of practice, and so forth. As we’ll see, scientific progress in the face of epistemic scarcity 
doesn’t simply turn on new knowledge and technology pertaining to the science’s subject (the 
fossil record, say) but also on our knowledge of the history of science itself. That is, data-time is 
just as crucial as phenomena-time for understanding scientific underdetermination and whether 
it can be overcome. I’ll argue this puts pressure on the idea that underdetermination itself is a 
useful framing for understanding science under epistemic scarcity.  
The central problem is that underdetermination framings lead to bets about whether 
particular sets of knowledge will be had, while the strategies adopted under epistemic scarcity 
are typically open: as opposed to tackling a particular piece of knowledge or hypothesis, 
scientists explore what can be done with the resources they have. I’ll suggest, then, an 
alternative framing of science under epistemic scarcity that focuses on resources, that is, the 
technologies, data, funding, and so forth, that afford scientific work; and strategies, that is, the 
approaches and methods that scientists adopt to do work with those resources. My hope is that 
this retools debate into more fruitful territory. 
In the first two sections I’ll provide conceptual grounding: analyzing epistemic scarcity 
(section 2) and then underdetermination (section 3). In the two sections following, I’ll argue that 
knowledge of science’s history is a way of overcoming underdetermination despite epistemic 
scarcity (section 4), especially when used in combination with new technologies (section 5). In 
section 6, I’ll use the preceding discussions to argue that underdetermination is a bad way of 
framing science under epistemic scarcity and sketch my alternative. 
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Of course, that legacy data and technological capacities matter for understanding scientific 
progress is no surprise to historians and sociologists of science, nor indeed scientists 
themselves2. My aim, in a sense, is to show how lessons from scientific practice and its history are 
transformative of philosophical approaches. In my small way, then, I’m attempting to bring 
science’s history and sociology into further contact with its philosophy. Throughout these 
discussions I’ll be returning to work on the Paluxy River Trackways. I’ve chosen this case study as 
an excellent illustration of epistemic scarcity, as well as how legacy data and technological 
progress together often provide routes to progress in the face of it. Thus, future scientific 
success—stepping forwards—can be founded in understanding the practices and data of past 
science—looking back.   
2. Epistemic Scarcity 
Although some discussions of historical science attempt general treatments (e.g., Cleland 
2001, 2002, Kleinhans, Buskes & de Regt 2005, Turner 2007) this is a mug’s game: epistemic 
fortune differs too widely across sciences concerned with the deep past to support generality 
about method or epistemic fortune. Sometimes our access to the past is impoverished, but 
historical data can be plentiful, our understanding of some historical processes are 
extraordinarily detailed, our technological and analytic resources sometimes powerful, and some 
historical phenomena leave unambiguous, dramatic traces. Part of my aim is to rejig philosophical 
analysis from general disciplinary categories like ‘historical science’ towards more epistemically 
relevant categories. We can still have systematic analysis of science if we can identify the right 
domains. My hunch is that epistemic scarcity is one such domain, which makes sense of 
philosophical argument concerning underdetermination. So, although our guiding case study—
the Paluxy River Trackways—is from vertebrate ichnology, I don’t mean to claim that it is 
                                                             
2 For recent historical and sociological discussion of data production and management in the historical 
sciences see Jones (2020), Nieuwland (2019), Rieppel (2012) & Sepkoski & Tamborini (2018). 
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representative of historical science: it is instead representative of epistemic scarcity. Let’s turn to 
the case.  
A decent chunk of Texas, stretching from Dallas westward beyond Fort Worth, provides a 
remarkable inroads to twenty-million years of Cretaceous fossils (Farlow et al 2015). Although 
there are bountiful body fossil deposits to be had, we’ll focus on ichnology, or the fossilized 
remains of animal activity: burrows, eggs and trackways. Regarding trackways, the Paluxy River is 
an important site. The river is hard to work: subject to frequent flooding, underwater trackways 
are tricky to extract or photograph, and dry-spells frequently turns river to mud. Despite this, 
since the early 20th Century it has been a rich source of ichnological finds, particularly of 
sauropod dinosaurs. 
Most well-known is the so-called ‘chase sequence’, which records tracks from multiple 
sauropod individuals and at least one therapod. In the 1930s and ‘40s, Roland T Bird interpreted 
the sauropod and therapod tracks in terms of predatory behavior and avoidance, painting an 113 
million year old story.  
… one set of footprints, from a two-footed carnivorous dinosaur… ran parallel to the 
trail left by an even larger, four-footed herbivore… which was apparently traveling in a 
herd. And he later noticed that the carnivorous dinosaur seemed at one point to have 
taken a strange skipping stride, leaving two consecutive right footprints in the mud. 
(Thomas & Farlow 1997, 76). 
Here’s a tempting interpretation: the therapod was chasing the sauropod and that strange 
skipping stride captures the moment where the predator lunges. What are the interpretation’s 
epistemic credentials? That is, what reason do we have to think the prints were in fact made at 
the same time? Or that something as subtle as a change in gait signals a predatory strike? 
Considering information loss over data-time, these questions are daunting. 
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In 1940, Bird was dispatched by the American Museum of Natural History on a “herculean” 
task (Farlow et al 2015, 14): to extract the main chase sequence for analysis and display. The 
trackways, over 9 meters in length, couldn’t be taken in one piece. Bird extracted three 
connected segments, and these were distributed to various museums: one to his employers, 
another to the Texas Memorial Museum, and the third has been lost. In addition to the lost part 
of the trackways, the Texas Memorial Museum’s specimen has since degraded while on display. 
The splitting, deterioration and loss of the trackways is a significant epistemic loss. Body fossils 
and trace fossils record different kinds of information, and tracks from multiple individuals across 
species are rare. 
Tracks, traces and footprints can offer us insights that are unlikely, or even impossible, to 
preserve in the osteological fossil record. Information about trackmaker anatomy, 
behaviour, motions and ecology is tied up in the three-dimensional morphology that we 
ultimately call a track (Falkingham et al 470) 
The breaking up, degradation and loss of the Paluxy River Trackways themselves seems to 
mean that we cannot re-analyse Bird’s primary data. Considering the epistemic scarcity of 
vertebrate paleontology highlights this. 
Epistemic scarcity concerns data, so I’ll begin by drawing on Leonelli’s account of that notion. 
Where ‘data’ is often discussed interchangeably with evidence, Leonelli has convincingly 
distinguished them (Leonelli 2016). Her account is relational: in short, we can think of data as 
potential evidence. It is generated by various scientific procedures, produced by an experiment 
and recorded, say, or extracted from a site and prepared. The data is subsequently deployed as 
evidence downstream. In the context of paleontology ‘data’ refers to (among other things) both 
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fossil specimen3 and to various representations of fossils. These representations, and the fossils, 
take varied forms and are transported—undertake journeys—across contexts. Data-journeys 
involve “the movement of data from their production site to many other sites in which they are 
processed, mobilised and repurposed” (Leonelli 2020, 17). Leonelli emphasizes how these 
recording and journeying practices involve decontextualizing data from the context of its 
generation, thus allowing it to be catalogued and mixed. Employing data as evidence then 
involves its recontexualization. Meta-data records information about the data’s generation and 
subsequent journeying, and thus affords scientists the capacity to recontextualize. Nora Boyd 
makes a similar point, in terms of ‘data enrichment’: the process of combining data with its meta-
data and surrounding knowledge to form an evidential claim. As she puts it, “data can never be 
permanently decoupled from their associated enriching information and retain epistemic utility” 
(Boyd 2018, 413). 
So, we can consider the Paluxy trackways as paleontological data. Processes of extraction, 
preparation, cataloguing and management decontextualized the trackways. To be used as 
evidence, say, in inferring from the trackways to past animal behavior, the data must be enriched. 
Paleontologists recontexualise the trackways with details of their data-journey and with relevant 
knowledge about processes of fossilization and animal behavior. But fossils themselves are not 
the only relevant paleontological data: so too are sketches, photographs, descriptions and other 
ways of representing them. As we’ll see, Bird took photographs, sketches and video of the 
trackways, and these are put to use by modern paleontologists. So, we can understand 
paleontological data, such as the fossils themselves or recordings of them, as potential evidence 
which, if suitably enriched, can be employed to support hypotheses. With our relational account 
of data in hand, we can turn to epistemic scarcity. 
                                                             
3 You might question whether fossil themselves (as opposed to representations of them) should be 
considered data. By my lights they clearly are: fossils are extracted, processed and often directly examined 
in forming paleontological claims. They go on data-journeys just as much as their representations. 
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‘Epistemic scarcity’ is a feature of a domain’s data, not its evidence, and concerns four 
features. Scarcity occurs when data is rare, non-renewable, fragile and demanding. The first two 
are features of phenomena-time, the second two of data-time. Recall that ‘phenomena-time’ 
concerns the processes effecting data-sources prior to their becoming data, while ‘data-time’ 
concerns scientific activities of data-preparation, management and journeys. ‘Phenomena-time’ 
refers to data’s sources (occurring naturally or being generated in an experiment) while ‘data-
time’ refers to the data’s ‘life’. The trackways decaying due to geological subduction or water 
damage is phenomena-time, the trackways being split into three parts happens in data-time. The 
distinction is no-doubt blurry at times, and indeed whether a process will count as occurring in 
phenomena-time or data-time will be sensitive to what phenomena we’re interested in, but I 
think it nonetheless extremely useful for picking apart various aspects of epistemic scarcity. 
‘Rarity’ refers to the likelihood of the data’s occurrence. Both paleontology and particle 
physics often deal with rare data. The conditions of fossilization, and the conditions under which 
fundamental particles might be detected, are specific and peculiar, meaning data is rare. Data 
being ‘non-renewable’ refers to scientists’ capacity to generate relevant data. Where particle 
physicists can bring about the conditions where collisions might be detected, data from the fossil 
record cannot (on the face of it) be similarly generated. Thus, paleontological data is often non-
renewable while some physical data is not (assuming that the knowhow, resources and desire to 
build particle accelerators remains). By contrast, some (but only some!) cosmological data—
background radiation from the big bang for example—is common, but not renewable.  
Rarity and being non-renewable are not independent: our capacity to generate data makes a 
difference to its rarity. However, they’re worth pulling apart because they refer to pertinent 
differences between phenomena. Some phenomena do not often naturally occur, but can be 
generated—as we see in particle physics—while other phenomena are both rare and are also not 
amenable to being generated, for instance the behaviors of extinct critters. Non-renewability is 
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often emphasized in vertebrate paleontology. Consider for instance a recent letter by the Society 
of Vertebrate Paleontology:  
These fossils, remains and traces of prehistoric life, are inherently non-renewable. This 
means that reproducibility of paleontological research rests on the premise of 
permanency and accessibility of examined fossil specimens permanently accessioned and 
deposited in stable repositories within the public trust, each with a unique permanent 
catalog number (2020, 2) 
Where rarity and non-renewability concern phenomena-time, fragility and being demanding 
are features of data-time. ‘Fragility’ refers to the likelihood of information being lost on data-
journeys. Although many vertebrate fossils are solid rock, their extraction and preparation are 
often risky procedures with breakage and distortion being common. They are also ‘demanding’: 
data-management is an enormous challenge. Vertebrate fossils are often extremely heavy, 
require a lot of space, and are subject to on-going recategorization as ideas change. As with rarity 
and being non-renewable, fragility and demandingness are not independent. Clearly, the fragility 
of fossils is part of what makes them so tricky to manage as data. However, again, these do not 
strictly overlap. In addition to challenging data-management, fragility makes data generation 
(extraction and preparation) particularly risky.  
The Paluxy River trackways are a paradigm example of epistemic scarcity (table 1). First, 
trackways are rare: the conditions under which footprints might fossilize are highly specific, and 
the chances of any particular set of tracks surviving over geological time and then being found 
are vanishingly small. Second, trackways are non-renewable: although experimental ichnology 
can generate partial simulacra of past trackways, we cannot literally make more trackways in the 
fossil record. Third, trackways are fragile: over data-time the Paluxy river trackways were broken 
up, lost and degraded. Fourth, trackways are demanding: expensive to store, hard to categorize 
and so forth. 
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 Phenomena-Time Data-Time 
Rarity Renewability Fragility Demandingness 
 
Definition 
The likelihood of 
data’s 
occurrence. 
The capacity of 
scientists to 
generate data. 
The likelihood of 
data being lost 
on journeys. 
The challenges 
of managing the 
data. 
 
 
E.g., 
 
Trackways are 
rare because the 
likelihood of 
their being 
preserved and 
then surviving 
geological time 
are miniscule. 
 
Trackways are 
non-renewable 
because time 
constraints 
mean they 
cannot be 
artificially 
constructed. 
Trackways are 
fragile because 
extraction 
requires 
decisions about 
what 
information to 
preserve and 
pieces are often 
broken. 
 
 
 
Trackways are 
large, heavy, 
pieces of rock. 
  
There’s a lot to be said about conditions of epistemic scarcity, far more than I can manage in 
this paper. For one thing, various practices of data management amongst paeontologists can be 
understood as means of mitigating the fragility and demandingness of their data. Increasing use 
of 3D printing, non-destructive ways of getting at fossil structure such as CT scans, as well as 
historical practices of fossil illustration are all ways of producing less-demanding, robust data. For 
another, data is often intended for multiple uses, and this can be a source of its demandingness. 
These uses sometimes include partially clashing scientific aims. For instance, using a fossil for 
phylogenetic analysis versus using it to order strata likely benefit from different cataloguing 
practices. But non-scientific aims are also a frequent concern: fossil preparation is often carried 
out with an eye to presentation in museums.  
We should further distinguish epistemic scarcity from Latour’s “tragically local” data (1999). 
Given the variability and contingency of historical processes, the kinds of evidential claims 
historical scientists can produce are often quite limited in scope, tied to, say, particular cultures, 
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technologies, lineages or clades4. The projectability of evidence across the cases of interest, and 
epistemic scarcity, can come apart. It doesn’t follow from epistemic scarcity that the resultant 
hypothesis cannot be projected across domains, and indeed highly contingent, heterogenous 
systems might nonetheless have common, renewable, robust and manageable data. Some 
questions concerning the Paluxy trackways, then, might be doubly tricky: involving both 
epistemic scarcity and non-projectability. 
The important aspect for our purposes is the relationship between underdetermination and 
epistemic scarcity. I’ll now suggest that when philosophers have framed historical science in 
terms of underdetermination they’ve had something like epistemic scarcity in mind. 
3. Underdetermination thus far 
The notion of underdetermination underwrites various philosophical disputes about the 
status of scientific knowledge, especially in recent discussion of historical science (better 
understood as, I’ll suggest, conditions of epistemic scarcity). Let’s start with definitions. 
‘Underdetermination’ is a relationship between a set of hypotheses and a set of evidence. It 
holds when the evidence-set is epistemically insufficient to decide between the hypotheses. By 
identifying different sets, different kinds of underdetermination are generated. First, we’ve ‘in 
principle’ forms of underdetermination. These consider all possible hypotheses and all possible 
evidence, or perhaps current hypotheses against all possible evidence. It might be that, for any 
particular hypothesis, there are necessarily other possible hypotheses who accommodate the 
relevant evidence just as well; that is, any hypothesis has empirically equivalent rivals. Views on 
the pervasiveness of this kind of underdetermination underwrite various challenges to the 
possibility of scientific knowledge (e.g, Goodman 1955; Kukla 1996). For instance, if current 
                                                             
4 See, for instance, Matthewson’s discussion of ‘heterogeneity’ (2011), as well as Elliott-Graves’ 
development and Currie & Walsh’s developments of it (Elliott-Graves 2016, Currie & Walsh 2018). Also, my 
discussions of ‘local’ knowledge (Currie 2019a, Currie forthcoming). 
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hypotheses pertaining to the nature of unobservables are in principally underdetermined by any 
evidence we could have, then we might deny that scientists can establish the truth (or 
justification) of hypotheses about those unobservables (e.g., Clendinnen 1989, Quine 1975, Van 
Fraassen 1980). The thought that any given theory in principle will have equally well-supported 
possible rivals has, in Laudan & Leplin’s terms: 
… wrecked havoc throughout twentieth-century philosophy. It motivates many forms of 
relativism, both ontological and epistemological, by supplying apparently irremediable 
pluralism of belief and practice. It animates epistemic skepticism by apparently 
underwriting the thesis of underdetermination. In general, the supposed ability to supply 
an empirically equivalent rival to any theory, however well supported or tested, has been 
assumed sufficient to undermine our confidence in that theory and to reduce our 
preference for it to a status epistemically weaker than warranted assent. (Laudan & 
Leplin 1991, 450) 
The thinking is straightforward. We should prefer a scientific theory insofar as it outperforms 
its rivals on evidential grounds. But if for any theory there are in principle other theories which 
are equally-well supported by the same evidence, then we haven’t grounds for preferring it (at 
least vis-à-vis those rivals). As with any long-standing philosophical dispute, there are multiple 
routes to avoiding these skeptical conclusions (e.g., Devitt 2002, Churchland 1985, Psillos 1999). 
Laudan & Leplin’s approach is relevant for our discussion, so is worth sketching (although see 
Sarkar 2000, Kukla 1993, Okasha 1997, Stanford 2006).  
At base, Laudan & Leplin emphasize how scientific knowledge evolves and develops. What 
counts as evidence is a shifting target, depending as it does on technological capacities and 
background theory. That is, evidential equivalence is not a simple relationship between a set of 
evidence and a set of hypotheses. It relies on (1) the stability of that set of evidence, as what was 
once unobservable sometimes becomes observable as technology and understanding evolves; 
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(2) the stability of ‘auxiliary’ hypotheses which connect observations to the theories at hand. The 
upshot for in-principle treatments of underdetermination is that the rubber doesn’t hit the 
epistemic road: we “… must defer, in part, to scientific practice. It undercuts any formalistic 
program to delimit the scope of scientific knowledge by reason of empirical equivalence, thereby 
defeating the epistemically otiose morals that empirical equivalence has been made to serve” 
(454, see Turner 2016 for similar points).  
Following arguments like Lauden & Leplin’s, as well as general turns towards practice-
oriented, contextual analyses, recent discussion of underdetermination has focused on ‘local’ 
variants. Here, a set of current hypotheses are underdetermined by the available evidence. That 
is, a set of hypotheses which are currently, as it were, on the scientific table, are not preferred (or 
not sufficiently preferred) on the basis of the evidence scientists have produced and are currently 
producing (Godfrey-Smith 2008, Laudan 1990, Sklar 1977, Stanford 2009, Currie 2018). In contrast 
with in-principle underdetermination, cases of local underdetermination are more-or-less robust. 
Some might be easily resolvable, if only the right evidence was found. Others are more 
intransigent: we might have reason to think the right evidence is unlikely to show up. In the 
philosophy of historical science, a debate about the epistemic power of our access to the past 
turns on the resilience of otherwise of local underdetermination (Turner 2004, 2007, 2009, 2016; 
Currie 2015, 2017, 2018; Tucker 2012; O’Malley 2015, Wylie 2019, Forber 2009, Kleinhans, Buskes & 
de Regt 2005). 
Derek Turner claims that intransigent local underdetermination is rife in the historical 
sciences (2004, 2007). First, he argues that historical processes are typically information-
destroying. For instance, we know the conditions of trackway fossilization are highly specific, and 
that they’re likely to degrade or be destroyed over time. As such, underdetermination which 
would be resolved by discovering new trackways is unlikely to be so. Second, he compares the 
capacities of experimental science with that of historical science. Where for historical science 
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primary evidence is from the historical record, in experimental science new primary data may be 
generated by, well, experiment. To the extent that historical records are degraded and 
incomplete, then, our hands are tied vis-à-vis improving our epistemic situation.  
Thus, we have an argument that in historical science local underdetermination will be 
intransigent. We should, then, be pessimistic about scientific progress in such fields5. I think it 
clear that Turner has (or should have!) something like epistemic scarcity in mind: there are plenty 
of examples across the historical sciences of robust, abundant, renewable, easily managed data 
and here his arguments are weaker. We can, then, construe the debate about 
underdetermination not about historical science per se, but about science under conditions of 
epistemic scarcity (which may include non-historical science…). 
In response, more optimistic philosophers have pointed to various sources of overcoming 
underdetermination. 
First, evidence might not be as rare as Turner argues. Our expectations of making new finds 
are tempered by our knowledge of the processes by which information is preserved or lost. And, 
as Laudan and Leplin emphasized, this knowledge evolves: information which we once thought 
destroyed turns out to not be (Jeffares 2010, Currie 2018). The field of ancient DNA is a case-in-
point. Where previously it was thought that molecular structures are unrecoverable, we now 
know that molecular signals do leave traces, and the temporal window by which they might be 
detected is increasingly pushed back. Second, and relatedly, our technological capacities 
continually evolve, and this often means that new, often unexpected information can be 
extracted from traces (Temporini 2019, Novick et al 2020, we’ll return to technology below). 
Third, the non-renewable nature of historical data may be challenged. Our capacity to create 
                                                             
5 Philosophers of science often connect these pessimistic arguments to questions of scientific realism: 
if underdetermination is rife and intransigent, then we’ve not sufficient reason to think that the 
hypotheses in question are true. In this paper I’ll be focusing on pessimism and optimism rather than 
realism. 
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simulacra of past objects and processes, it has been argued, can mitigate information destruction 
over phenomena-time (Jeffares 2008, Currie 2018 chapter 9).  
So, whether we think local underdetermination will be overcome is the product of how likely 
it is that (1) our knowledge of historical processes will change (at least in ways that grant access 
to new data-sources), (2) our technological capacities to analyse historical processes will change, 
and (3) whether our capacity to generate simulacra will increase. And these three sources are not 
independent, often bolstering one another. This leads to a debate about, on the one hand, how 
information destroying or preserving we should think the processes shaping the historical record 
over phenomena-time are, and on the other hand, the capacities of scientists to develop new 
ways of extracting information from the historical record and to generate new evidence (e.g., 
Currie 2019b, Finkelman 2019, Havstad 2019). 
As the number of clashing considerations in favor of optimism and pessimism increase, 
agnosticism becomes plausible. Joyce Havstad (2019) has argued that we ought to be agnostic 
about optimism and pessimism, because we simply lack the epistemic resources for reliable bets: 
…the agnostic position stems from a lack of confidence: it is the inability to say whether 
historical processes are disposed to preserve or to destroy, and what sort of evidential 
position historical scientists are thereby in. (5) 
Havstad’s argument focuses on phenomena-time: it is unclear how to ascertain just what 
information has been preserved and what information has been destroyed as the historical 
record has formed. Patrick Forber takes a similar position: 
We cannot be in an epistemic position now to assess whether two incompatible rivals are 
empirical equivalent relative to all present and future evidence ... we can make no reliable 
inferences about how our epistemic position will persist into the future. (Forber 2009, 
255) 
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Turner (2016) has characterized agnosticism as “adop[ing] a policy of abstaining from any 
further predictions about which questions scientists will or will not be able to answer in the 
future” (64). He provides two arguments against agnosticism. First, just as general optimism or 
pessimism across historical science is an odd position, so too is general agnosticism. For we do 
have some grip on what historical knowledge is easier to be had than others. Second, “scientists 
routinely draw inferences about the future of their own fields” (65). The necessity of scientists 
making bets undermines the thought that such bets shouldn’t be made. As we’ll see, taking data-
time more seriously further complexifies the considerations here, and potentially bolsters 
agnosticism; however, I’ll suggest a different framing of these debates. To get there, let’s turn to 
an example of how scientists can overcome underdetermination despite epistemic scarcity. 
4. Legacy Data 
The loss of the Paluxy-River trackways was not total. In addition to his extraction efforts, Bird 
used various mediums to record the trackways as they originally appeared: he made field 
sketches, took multiple photographs and a film recording. These historical documents, ‘legacy 
data’, potentially allow us to ‘revisit’ the site prior to extraction. 
As we’ve seen, data is well-understood as potential evidence which is generated in a 
particular context, then ‘journeying’ through various processes of cleaning, cataloguing, and so 
forth, before being ‘enriched’ to support evidential claims. Data, then, form lineages: “historical 
entities which – much like organic beings – evolve and change as their life unfolds and merges 
with elements of their environment” (Leonelli 2020, 16). Across the life of a discipline, different 
best-practices, techniques, and mediums are used both in data generation and in the recording of 
metadata. An upshot of this is that data from different times—produced using different 
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practices—might well be unamenable to employment now. ‘Legacy data’, then, refers to data 
produced in historical contexts6.  
The epistemic problems arising from the use of legacy data are not conceptually distinct from 
data generally, but in legacy contexts some challenges are particularly acute. The context of 
data’s generation and subsequent journeying makes a difference to what kinds of claims it can 
underwrite and how it relates to other data. Metadata can be insufficient; data can come from 
profoundly different sources; we might lack sufficient understanding of past practices. Because 
data-journeys always matter for data’s employment as evidence, there is a sense in which all data 
is legacy data. All data has been produced in the past, and that past matters for what evidential 
uses it can be put to (Leonelli 2018, Currie 2019a). However in cross-disciplinary cases, for 
instance, or when practices are not standardized, or when—our focus here—data has been 
produced in the past using different techniques, technologies and best practices, these 
challenges are amplified. So, although ‘legacy data’ is not special conceptually, it is a useful focus 
for considering epistemic challenges arising from underdetermination. 
Legacy data is critically important under epistemic scarcity. Because data is rare and non-
renewable, scientists haven’t the luxury of simply finding or generating new specimens. 
Specimens like the Paluxy trackways are thus precious, and there is good reason to try to 
overcome the challenges involved with integrating and reanalysing data produced under 
different contexts using different practices. This reanalysis often involves reconstructing the past 
conditions of science itself: in a sense, our phenomena becomes past scientific work. As Alison 
Wylie puts it: 
In the case of legacy data this appraisal sometimes involves quite literally retracing the 
steps of those who originally recovered a sample back into the field or to the repositories 
                                                             
6 Most discussions of ‘legacy data’ are in the context of computational data management (e.g., Roth & 
Schwartz 1997, Turau 1999). My usage is more general than these. 
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and laboratories to which finds and records were dispersed, reconstructing a record of 
the context from which it was drawn and the processes by which it was transformed… 
(Wylie 2020, 271) 
A common feature of legacy data is the role of luck: often highly contingent events lead to 
recovery, perhaps analogous to the rareness of fossilization over phenomena-time. For the 
Paluxy Trackways, a series of contingent events led to the rediscovery of Bird’s recordings. As 
Thomas & Farlow report, in the 1980’s one of them (Farlow) acted as referee for a biography of 
Bird’s life, and was surprised to find references to various charts, photographs and even a film of 
the excavation. 
Interviews with Bird’s wife and sister revealed that he had stashed away quite a bit of 
unpublished information about the Paluxy River trackway. Bird’s nephew soon 
discovered a canister with the lost film of the excavation; it was neatly stored in a 
basement refrigerator. A box in Bird’s attic provided countless notes, along with some 
large charts of the footprints in question. (1997, 76). 
 Working with Bird’s rediscovered reference material, Farlow was able to closely analyse the 
footfalls and argue that the predator’s movements closely paralleled those of the sauropod. 
Comparisons with the behavior of mammalian predators such as lions found further parallels in 
the trackways’ skipping stride. 
… it now appears perfectly clear that about 100 million years ago, on a limey mudflat in 
what is now Texas, at least one swift carnivore singled out and possibly attacked a huge, 
lumbering herbivore. It seems that Bird was not only lucky enough to find remarkable 
evidence of this incident of natural history but that he was also wise enough to 
recognize, document and excavate part of the record of this ancient hunt left on a 
sodden plain, now turned to stone (79). 
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So, analysis of Bird’s own reference material provides new evidence supporting his original 
hypothesis. We might say that Bird’s photos are precious similarly to the trackways: if they had 
been lost or degraded over data-time, then reconstructing the trackways in situ would be a much 
more daunting prospect. Our story of the Paluxy River trackways is a classic case of putting 
legacy data—Bird’s photographs—to new evidential use.  
However, just as the fidelity of information over phenomena-time crucially matters for the 
epistemic support of hypotheses, so too does the trustworthiness information over data-time. 
That is, should we trust Bird’s material? How well did he record the relevant information? To what 
extent did his own interpretation influence how he recorded data? Here, technology interweaves 
with legacy data to provide new inroads into the past. 
5. Technology & Legacy 
As we’ve seen, the recovery of Bird’s legacy data enabled new analysis of the trackways 
despite the loss and degradation of the fossils themselves. However, open questions still 
remained as to the trustworthiness of that legacy data. Recently, technological developments 
have allowed scientists to further reconstruct the trackways and gain insights to exactly that 
question. 
Ichnology has made technological strides in the last decade, particularly as various scanning 
and photogrammetry techniques have become affordable and portable. This has led to a 
concerted effort to document the Paluxy River site in situ (Farlow et al 2012). Building on this, 
Falkingham et al use modern technology and Bird’s photographs to reconstruct the trackways as 
they were in 1940, which in turn serve as data to reconstruct the trackways as they were in the 
Cretaceous, along the way providing inroads into the trustworthiness of Bird’s data.  
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Photogrammetry is a way of drawing a 3 dimensional topography from 2 dimensional 
photographs. Basically, photogrammetric techniques map spots on a 2 dimensional plane and 
represent them in 3 dimensions. Photogrammetry is used, for instance, to represent a landscape 
in 3 dimensions on the basis of satellite photographs. Using 17 of Bird’s photographs, Falkingham 
et al applied photogrammetry to the trackways. The resultant 3D representation is imperfect: the 
photographs are grainy, tools and other objects on the site obscure some of the tracks, and the 
shots are mostly from the same orientation. However, the photogrammetry results can be 
compared both to Bird’s original sketches and to the still existing parts of the original trackways. 
They conclude, “the entire sequence observable from the photographs was reconstructed in 3D, 
measuring over 45 m in length. Although the tracks lack fine detail, their locations are obvious on 
the textured model, and as such an aerial-view of the site, as it was prior to excavation, can be 
produced” (3). 
Falkingham et al then compared their results with Bird’s two maps of the site. This allowed 
them to identify one as being more accurate, as well make various inferences about how Bird 
went about measurements and extraction by contrasting distances in the reconstructed site with 
Bird’s tabulated data (they suspect he used string, and took individual, independent 
measurements rather than using a grid). Most impressively, they appear to detect therapod 
trackways which Bird’s sketches missed. The work gives us some grip on the epistemic 
credentials of Bird’s original recordings of the trackways. Further, the new trackways might 
suggest the predator was not acting alone. The techniques, then, allowed an inference to what 
the trackways were like prior to excavation while providing insights to the practices and 
techniques Bird used. 
It is an exciting prospect to think that many palaeontological or archaeological specimens 
that have been lost to science, or suffered irreparable damage, may be digitally 
reconstructed in 3D using free software and a desktop computer. We envisage that 
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historical photogrammetry will become a powerful, common, tool in the future, 
particularly as advances in photogrammetric techniques enable software to compensate 
for the difficulties inherent in using old photographs. (5) 
So, it seems that the Paluxy River trackways have not been lost after all; they’ve been 
reanimated via a combination of new technology and old recovered records (see Lallensack et al 
2015 for another example). The epistemic license is iterative: Falkingham et al navigate between 
the photogrammetric techniques, the photos, Bird’s sketches, the surviving trackways, and Bird’s 
tabulated data.  
The role of technological progress is a common theme in discussion of local 
underdetermination (Jeffares 2008, Chapman & Wylie 2017 chap 4, Wylie 2019). My own 
arguments for optimism appeal to a strategy called ‘methodological omnivory’, at base the idea 
that historical scientists adopt, co-opt and construct multiple imperfect techniques for recovering 
the past (Currie 2016, 2018). I’ve emphasized the local and targeted aspects of these techniques: 
as opposed to generally-applicable technologies, these are built specifically to work with the 
particular materials, background knowledge and questions the scientists are faced with. 
Falkingham et al’s use of photogrammetry techniques are tailored specifically towards probing 
the original conditions of Bird’s extraction efforts, and their conclusions vis-à-vis Bird’s legacy 
data is based on their understanding of the limitations of the technology they use and the data 
they’re working with. They no-doubt emphasize the possibility of such technology being adopted 
and applied across various ichnological contexts (as we’ll see, they draw on this kind of work to 
argue for a new system of best practice), but their particular adoption and deployment of 
photogrammetry is tailored towards their local context: it is an example of methodological 
omnivory. 
Marco Tamborini takes things further, arguing that the historical sciences are best 
understood in technoscientific terms. These are disciplines where “science and technology cannot 
23 
 
be easily separated” (57). Tamborini’s point, as I see it, is that historical scientists’ attempts to 
understand the past shouldn’t be understood as primarily in the business of veridical 
representation, they’re rather interested in finding ways to probe and represent their data: 
[Their] main aim was not to correctly represent what it actually was, but rather to 
technically manage, experiment with, visualize, produce, and efficiently work with the 
natural historical phenomena they struggled to understand (Tamborini, 58). 
On this view, instead of trying to answer, say, whether a therapod dinosaur lunged at a 
sauropod millions of years ago, or even whether Bird took reliable data, Falkingham et al are 
primarily interested in finding ways to ‘work with’ their data or natural phenomena. On the face 
of it, this claim is somewhat mysterious: it is unclear how we should understand ‘phenomena’ in 
Tamborini’s terms. First, if we understand ‘phenomena’ as including events in the past, then it is 
unclear how we can contrast this with representing what actually was, as these are—we might 
think—the same thing. Second, if we understand ‘phenomena’ in terms of scientists’ 
representations of data (data models, etc…) this seems to fly in the face of what the scientists 
we’ve been discussing were clearly trying to do: use data to make inferences about what 
happened in the past. Below, I’ll suggest this can be resolved by taking a more relaxed 
conception of scientific aims or goals. 
Regardless, both Tamborini and myself emphasize the role of technological progress in 
investigating the deep past. The important point for current purposes is how technological 
progress works in data-time: new technology doesn’t simply allow new information to be drawn 
from new data, but also from ‘old’ data. Legacy data that was once irretrievable is now 
retrievable. It is in light of Bird recording his data, this then being discovered by folks with 
sufficient understanding of past scientific practices to put it to work, and the development and 
availability of photogrammetry techniques that Falkingham et al managed the recovery work 
they did. Thus, in the face of epistemic scarcity, scientists went forwards by looking back. This 
24 
 
interweaving of legacy data, reanalysis, and the use of new technology further complexifies 
discussion of underdetermination under epistemic scarcity.  
6. Beyond Underdetermination 
Philosophers often frame questions about the epistemic credentials of historical science (or 
scientists facing epistemic scarcity) in terms of local underdetermination problems: given that 
current evidence does not decide between conflicting hypotheses, should we bet that 
underdetermination will be overcome or not? We’ve seen that increasing focus on scientific 
practice has led to such questions becoming increasingly complex, making agnostic positions 
more attractive. My aim in this section is to first, articulate how focus on data-time, legacy data 
and technological progress makes these questions still yet more intractable. Second, suggest 
that instead of adopting agnosticism, or arguing for optimism or pessimism about particular 
kinds of knowledge, we should adopt a different framing: one in terms of resources and 
strategies. Third, I’ll use these considerations to argue against the idea that scientists under 
epistemic scarcity are passive: they adopt active strategies geared towards mitigating epistemic 
scarcity. 
6.1 Data-time & Underdetermination 
As I’ve mentioned, epistemic scarcity refers to data, not evidence. This is because we 
shouldn’t infer directly from epistemic scarcity to evidential impoverishment. My having fragile, 
demanding, rare and non-renewable data doesn’t entail that evidential claims made on that basis 
will be locally underdetermined, unfounded or weak. The historical sciences are replete with 
examples of powerful evidential claims in the face of epistemic scarcity. However, conditions of 
epistemic scarcity do make underdetermination problems particularly pertinent. 
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Whether we can resolve debates between pessimism and optimism turns on how opaque 
science’s epistemic fortunes are. Considerations of information-loss and recovery over data-time 
doesn’t simply complexify the debate by increasing the number of sources of 
underdetermination and resources for overcoming it, they also increase the opaqueness of 
future scientific success and failure. Insofar as future epistemic fortune is indeed opaque, we 
philosophers face an impasse. This opacity only increases as we incorporate data-time. 
Caitlin Wylie has made steps in this direction. She notes that underdetermination occurs in 
data. She focuses on fossil preparation, the highly skilled business of generating a scientifically 
useable specimen from extracted rock. There is no one best or determined output in this process, 
results turning on differing aims, the skills of the preperator, and luck. “Potential data from 
fossils, therefore, are underdetermined by the surrounding rock” (Wylie 2019, 24). Thus, in 
addition to underdetermination between hypotheses and evidence, we should also consider 
underdetermination occurring between data and its sources. This is one step towards 
complexifying how philosophers think about underdetermination. The next step is to explicitly 
incorporate data-time. 
Turner’s arguments for pessimism focus on rarity and non-renewability, that is, phenomena-
time. Such arguments could be bolstered by pointing to the fragility and demandingness of 
historical data. Although the Paluxy trackways were a remarkable example of survival over 
phenomena-time, as we’ve seen they fared badly over data-time: extraction was rough, the 
trackways were split in three, one part became significantly degraded, another was lost. The 
recovery of Bird’s records was serendipitous, a happy-happenstance contingent on Bird making 
the recordings, their being kept, then Farlow refereeing Bird’s biography. Their survival over 
data-time is as remarkable as the trackway’s survival over phenomena-time. As such, Turner 
could expand the sources of underdetermination he draws on: not only is information-
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destruction a common feature of historical processes, but the fragility and demandingness of 
data under epistemic scarcity makes information-destruction ubiquitous over data-time.  
 Due to epistemic scarcity, then, the sources of underdetermination are much richer and 
more complex than philosophers have recognized. 
And yet, in our case-study we’ve seen apparent information-loss over data-time be partly 
overcome. By drawing on photogrammetry techniques and exploiting records of the tracks prior 
to extraction, Falkingham et al recovered much of the Paluxy trackways thought lost, as well as 
the practices and techniques used in that past context. Just as focusing on data-time increases 
the sources of underdetermination, it also increases our means of overcoming it. I’ve emphasized 
how legacy data, especially in light of new technological capacities, can be re-interpreted, re-
analysed and re-deployed. The strength of our inferences to the Paluxy River’s past involved 
going forwards by looking back. So, data-time also reveals new sources of overcoming 
underdetermination. 
Consideration of data-time strengthens agnosticism. Where Havstad focused on our 
ignorance concerning information preservation over phenomena-time, we can now also 
emphasize our ignorance concerning information preservation over data-time. Attending to 
whether historical processes preserve or destroy information is not the only thing that matters, 
so also is whether scientific practices of data collation, management and deployment preserve or 
destroy information. As the range of factors determining investigative success becomes 
increasingly heterogenous and complex, epistemic fortunes become increasingly opaque, and 
thus bets on success or failure become increasingly risky. 
Taking data-time seriously stretches the use of framing debate in terms of 
underdetermination to breaking point. Agnosticism becomes more attractive, but Turner has 
made convincing points against agnosticism: sometimes surely we do have a good grip on what 
27 
 
kinds of things we’ll find out about the past, and—more pressingly—scientists themselves have 
to make judgments about which research strategies they adopt. Agnosticism, then, on the face 
of it, leaves philosophical analysis unable to inform what scientists should do (although see Currie 
2019a). Let’s sketch a preliminary alternative 
6.2 Retooling the Debate 
Happily, abandoning underdetermination as a way of framing epistemic questions concerning 
epistemic scarcity needn’t leave us rudderless, nor unable to provide normative analyses of 
science’s epistemic standing. My aim here is to illustrate the kind of alternative I have in mind. 
The framework is not intended to be fully realized and has similarities with Chang’s notion of 
‘systems of scientific practice’ (2013), Leonelli and Ankeny’s ‘repertoires’ (2015) and my ‘epistemic 
situations’ (2018). The point of the sketch is to show that moving beyond underdetermination 
needn’t undermine epistemic analysis. Instead of asking whether some open question about the 
past will be resolved or not, we should ask whether the strategy scientists adopt in light of it is 
likely to be productive given the available resources. Let’s get clear on these notions. 
At base, the ‘resources’ available to scientists are what they have to work with. I understand 
‘resources’ extremely broadly, including their available technologies, data and background 
theory but also their economic opportunities, social standing and so on. Epistemic scarcity 
focuses on a set of resources: namely, data. As we’ve seen, sometimes scientists operate with 
non-renewable, rare, demanding and fragile data. But this does not exhaust their resources. They 
also have myriad technological affordances available to record, store, analyse and interpret that 
data. These range from expert analysis of fossils, to statistical techniques, to data bases, to fossil 
storage facilities and best-practices, to various kinds of data analysis and transformation such as 
photogrammetry. But they also have socio-economic resources, such as placement in universities 
and museums, and various social structures provisioning funding and interest. Elizabeth Jones, 
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for instance, has explored how appeal to ‘celebrity’ provided a crucial set of complex cultural 
resources for the development of ancient genomics (Jones 2019).  
In light of available resources, scientists adopt differing strategies. A strategy, at base, is a 
means of either knowledge production or increasing the resource-base with which scientists 
work. In light of epistemic scarcity, scientists like Farlow and Falkingham et al adopt strategies 
which integrate re-analysis of legacy data with new technological development. Why they do this 
as opposed to some other kind of study is made sense of in light of their available resources. If, 
say, trackways were not so scarce then spending time developing techniques which allow us to 
work with legacy data would be odd; as legacy data would not be epistemically precious. 
Similarly, the use of ‘celebrity’ in paleontology is often geared towards garnering attention and 
funding for research, namely, increasing the available resource-base. 
Such questions can be asked across multiple scales. We might consider disciplinary or even 
cross-disciplinary resources and strategies. For instance, paleontology generally lacks a clear 
institutional home, spread across museums, as well as geology, biology and medical departments 
in universities. On the one hand, this is challenging as it can lead to disciplinary fragmentation. 
But on the other it can well-place paleontologists to interact with a wide variety of different 
disciplines and their resources. On smaller scales, we might consider the resources and strategies 
available to particular labs, or even individual researchers. A paleontologist with access to a CT 
scanner has different affordances than one without, and this difference in resource will make a 
difference to what strategies they should follow. 
So, I suggest philosophers ask whether a scientific investigation is a good strategy given 
available resources. Where underdetermination leads us to make bets about whether some piece 
of knowledge or other will be had by scientists—and potentially leads to an inert agnosticism—
analysing resources and strategies allows philosophers to both make sense of why scientists 
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conduct investigations as they do and potentially make judgements as to whether they ought to 
adopt the strategies they have. 
It is tempting to add a third element to this initial sketch: scientists’ aims. Here, at least when 
considering epistemic scarcity, I’m unsure whether a focus on aims is particularly productive. 
First, we might worry about how to actually identify scientists’ aims—a tricky discussion I’ll leave 
for later work. Second, recall my earlier worries about Tamborini’s view, namely whether we 
should understand historical scientists as attempting to reconstruct the past or develop 
technoscientific methods to explore phenomena. It seems to me that the strategies scientists 
adopt in light of epistemic scarcity are too open-ended for identifying a particular goal or set of 
goals. Falkingham et al are trying to correctly (if approximately) represent the Paluxy trackways 
prior to excavation, as well as Bird’s extraction and data-recording techniques, as well as test 
hypotheses about what in fact happened millions of years ago, as well as develop new ways of 
representing and exploring phenomena. It may be that in some contexts the particular aims of 
investigation are crucial for understanding scientific strategies, but the very opportunism and 
openness of scientists operating under epistemic scarcity undermines this as a general rule. 
Further, the notions of resource and strategy can make some headway on a pressing 
objection to my argument against the underdetermination framing. Surely, often we at least 
care—and it is often critically important—that we do get the right answer to scientific questions. 
That is, some knowledge matters for how we should respond to threats, organize our society and 
so forth. And in those contexts we certainly want to overcome underdetermination. No doubt: in 
the right context underdetermination looms large. In fact, we could view the (let’s call it) societal 
value of getting to the truth in terms of resources and strategies. I tend to view the relative 
unimportance of getting things right in some areas of historical science (does it really matter 
whether or not a sauropod was attacked by a therapod millions of years ago?) as a resource: it 
partly enables the open-ended and opportunistic strategies such scientists adopt. Of course, we 
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can also view societal value as a resource: researching pressing questions (say, the efficacy of 
public health interventions) enables scientists to gather funding, interest and passion. As such, 
the importance of underdetermination can be captured within the kind of framework I’ve 
suggested and—indeed—what counts as a ‘resource’ will often be a complex question requiring 
intimate examination of historical and social context. 
So, it is my contention—no doubt a sketchy one—that by focusing on resources and 
strategies philosophers are better placed to understand and inform scientific practice than by 
focusing on underdetermination. To close, I want to illustrate the importance of data-time in one 
more way, by pushing against to a hitherto little-remarked feature of how some philosophers 
think about historical science: passivity. 
6.3 The Passivity of Historical Science 
Turner’s original argument for pessimism turned in part on a distinction between ‘limiting’ 
and ‘promoting’ background theory. The latter, which he thinks is common in experimental 
science, tells us how to generate new data; the former, common in historical science, tells us how 
our data sources will degrade. In the parlance of this paper, experimental data is renewable and 
historical data is not. This is an example of what I’ll call the ‘passivity’ of historical science7. Where 
experimenters control their epistemic fates, historical scientists must work with what time’s 
information-destroying processes have left. Carol Cleland captures the idea evocatively: 
…[in historical science] one is at the mercy of what nature just happens to leave in her 
wake; sometimes she is generous and sometimes she is stingy, but the bottom line is that 
you can’t fool with her (Cleland 2002, 485). 
                                                             
7 ‘Passive’ views of historical science are not held by all philosophers: Ben Jeffares, Alison Wylie and my 
views, as well as Turner’s recent publications (e.g., Turner 2009, 2016), are certainly exceptions. 
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Focusing on phenomena-time, the motivation is clear: the rarity and non-renewability of data 
under epistemic scarcity seems to fundamentally limit what can be known. If the trackways were 
erased over geological time, so be it: they’re lost to us. And one might insist that the epistemic 
fate of historical reconstruction is beholden to what information traces hold (e.g., Havstad 2019). 
But turning to data-time, things look different. 
In conditions of epistemic scarcity, data is fragile and demanding. But as we’ve seen, various 
strategies can and do mitigate this. A common aspect of data journeys is their being transformed 
into more robust and easily managed forms. Paleontologists take casts of trackways, perform 
measurements, photograph them, and model them in digital environments. Indeed, 
consideration of legacy data can matter for science’s future success by providing lessons about 
how data should be managed now. Falkingham’s reconstruction of the trackways in situ turned in 
part on a happy happenstance. But this is not always the case: careful data storage and 
management can increase later scientists’ capacities to reuse and breathe new life into old data. 
For instance, new best-practices for managing ichnological data are being developed. Falkingham 
et al (2018) complain that in ichnology 
… communication has been almost exclusively limited to printed papers and books. This 
2D medium restricted the recording of tracks to sketches and lithographs, and later with 
the rise of the camera, photographs. Most ichnological literature, perhaps until only a 
few years ago, continued to rely solely on photos and drawings. Workers have thus spent 
the majority of their time reporting linear measurements in the horizontal plane (e.g. 
length, width and interdigital angle (IDA, or digit divarication); occasionally 
supplementing such metrics with a single measure of depth. (2018, 470, references 
removed) 
These older practices don’t capture the critical three-dimensional aspects of tracks. Tracks 
are not molds of their maker’s feet: the medium, impact of footfall, gait and so forth, must be 
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understood (not to mention the distortions introduced over geological time). In light of modern 
scanning and photogrammetry techniques (and their relative cheapness), Falkingham et al 
recommend “all reports of traces include 3D data collection, especially when new ichnotaxa are 
being erected” (472). Echoing the sorry state of the Paluxy trackways over data-time they argue 
that “where possible, digitization should be carried out prior to any physical replication (e.g. 
moulding or casting) as the physical replication process may alter the fossil either physically or 
chemically” (472, reference removed). They further give advice for how data should be presented 
and stored. The point of this standardization is to make the data amenable for travel, thus 
mitigating its demandingness and fragility. They, then, recommend a strategy aimed at increasing 
the resources available to ichnology. 
The development of new practices, standards, technologies and theories of data generation 
and journeying is a fundamentally active process (or we might say in Turner’s parlance, they are 
promoting rather than limiting). Consider the data-time analogue of information-loss over 
phenomena-time. Where for the latter we point to, say, the information-destruction of 
fossilization as revealed by our background theories, for the former we point to our background 
theories about current and past data generation, recording and management practices. For the 
latter, scientists are at ‘nature’s mercy’, but for the former, information loss turns on what 
scientists do: the decisions they make, practices they adopt, and so forth. And these practices are 
anything but passive.  
Now, recall my suggestions for re-tooling the debate. Instead of considering epistemic fate 
simplicita, we should ask what strategies are likely to contribute to success given particular 
resources (and, perhaps, aims). Given epistemic scarcity, scientists develop and adopt practices 
aimed at preserving the scarce remains of the past. This can mean standardizing digital data 
recording techniques, storage and dissemination as well as developing new technologies aimed 
at further analysis of legacy data. By considering the connection between available resources and 
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strategies, philosophers can explain scientific success and failure in a way sensitive to local 
conditions. No doubt this example is rather shallow: obviously good data-management practices 
are critical for scientific success. But notice how turning from questions about 
underdetermination to instead considering resources and strategies reveals a hitherto unnoticed 
philosophical mistake—the apparent passivity of historical science—and opens further 
questions. For example, we might ask to what extent Falkingham et al’s suggestions could 
restrict ichnology. For one thing, if the standard were adopted as a requirement for publication, 
only scientists with access to the relevant technologies, know-how and time would be able to 
meaningfully work in the area (see Leonelli 2018b for this kind of discussion). For another thing, 
potentially emphasizing some aspects of retrievable information could come at the cost of other 
aspects. So, alternative framing along these lines allows for productive, normative philosophical 
analysis of scientific practice. 
7. Conclusion 
No scientist would be surprised to hear that data extraction and management matters, being 
as it is such a fundamental aspect of their practices and success. But philosophers have often 
missed this, likely due to our focus on abstract considerations of hypotheses, evidence and 
information. As we’ve seen, however, considering relational notions of data, tracking data 
journeys, and generally understanding evidential reasoning as a complex temporal process, can 
be transformative of philosophical debates. Regarding the obstinateness or otherwise of local 
underdetermination, we see that there are no simple answers or general arguments to be had. 
Regarding debates about the epistemic prowess of science, we see that categories like 
‘epistemic scarcity’ are more useful than those like ‘historical science’. Regarding the notion that 
historical scientists can only work with what nature has provided, we see that this relies on 
abstracting from data-time: modulo that abstraction, they are just as active, in control of their 
fates, as any other discipline. This is especially acute under conditions of epistemic scarcity, 
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where data is precious, and here we’ve seen how both the data provided in legacy contexts, and 
our understanding of those practices themselves, can be a rich source of learning about the deep 
past. 
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